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Problematic Application of Florida Administrative
Law to Police Power Public Health Actions
Richard P. McNelis*
There has always been government, however distant and
predatory. But in the long ago ages of Europe, when paintings and
statuary all bore the same stock face and the same blank
expression, there was always Power. However they came into
authority, rulers keenly followed the precepts of Power, which for
them was both a tool and a purpose. The art of government was
identical with the uses of Power.' Is it efficient to hunt down and
punish one transgressor after another? Or is it prudent to make
examples of offenders, to restrain and intimidate a coarse citizenry
and its princes, and to thereby prevent bad acts from ever
occurring? Is it legal to protect the rest of society from bad actors
by segregating them? How about protecting society by making
people stay home for a few days if they have possibly been
exposed to dangerous disease? Where would a society get this
authority? It derives from police power, which pre-dated the first
organized colonies in North America, and existed before the first
government here.
I. WHAT IS POLICE POWER?
What exactly is police power? Reading court decisions is
confusing, and reading commentators is worse. Many express the
values of their times, trading on their credentials as lawyers and
experts. The common thread among all commentators, from
Burgess to Professor Freund to Judge Epstein, is a theoretical
approach to examinations of police power examination. 2 Burgess,
for example, described police power as "the dark continent of our
jurisprudence." 3 The theorists after him have given the term a
Copyright 2008, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
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1. NICOL MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE ch. 9 (1515).
2. D. Benjamin Barros, The Police Power and the Takings Clause, 58 U.
MIAMI L REV. 471,491-97 (2004).
3. Id at 497.
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theoretical rather than a legal meaning.4 Fortunately, there is a
handy alternative to the confusions of the political theorists: In
1847, the U.S. Supreme Court defined the police powers of a state,
saying they are neither "more [n]or less than the powers of
government inherent in every sovereignty to the extent of its
dominions," and that whenever a state exercises those powers, it
exercises "the power of sovereignty, the power to govern men and
things within the limits of its dominion."5 This legal definition is
much easier for practitioners to follow than the definitions based
on political theory.
Justice Taney's definition binds us today. His sweeping
definition includes a state's adoption of a quarantine law, as well
as laws to punish offenses, establish courts of justice, provide for
the recordation of instruments, or regulate commerce within its
borders. This simplifies things from the outset.
The nature of police power became a practical legal issue for
the Florida Department of Health when, after Hurricane Katrina,
the federal government shifted its focus slightly from bio-terror
preparedness to pandemic influenza preparedness. 6 In the bio-
terror arena, Florida's experience with anthrax indicated a clear
bifurcation between the law enforcement aspect and the public
health aspect of handling the AMI Building and the people who
worked there.7 Although the health department immediately
posted a health closure order on the facility-a form of state
quarantine order-the facility was also closed to the health
department as a crime scene under investigation. In essence, the
law enforcement exercise of police power in the form of crime
scene control delayed the health department exercise of police
power in the form of health investigation and response. Both law
enforcement and the health department were drawing from the
same well of authority. Realistically, the health department was
not injured because it was already fully engaged with the testing
4. Id. at 492.
5. The License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 583 (1847).
6. Exec. Order No. 13,375, 70 Fed. Reg. 17,299 (Apr. 1, 2005).
7. The AMI Building, located in Boca Raton, Florida, was the site of a
2001 anthrax scare. See generally Susan Candiotti & Mark Potter, Third Person
Shows Exposure to Anthrax, CNN.COM, Oct. 11, 2001, http://archives.cnn.com/
2001/HEALTH/10/10/anthrax/.
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and treatment of the workers, their families, and the casual contacts
of both. No one wanted to contract anthrax, and those directly and
tangentially exposed were fully cooperative with the health
department's heroic response to public concerns. In other words,
there were no legal challenges to the health department's actions.
Only a few years later, panflu planning, driven by requirements
of the National Response Plan and the National Strategy for
Pandemic Influenza, 8 and awards of federal planning grant dollars,
caused the Florida Department of Health to engage many sectors of
society, especially non-governmental sectors, in an attempt to
capitalize on our practical emergency response knowledge gained
through hurricane seasons and leverage that knowledge to respond
to a natural health calamity that theoretically put everyone at
serious risk.9
II. MANDATORY QUARANTINE
The moment came when panflu planning tackled mandatory
quarantine.1° In federal parlance, the term "quarantine" is now
placed in the innocuous-sounding category of "non-pharmaceutical
interventions."' "1 Prior to formal planning efforts, the Florida
Department of Health had politely declined offers from various
quarters to help with quarantine planning. The Health
Department's legal office took the position that a decision to
quarantine was a medical decision: "let's see what the doctors
say." Through that simple technique, the legal office bought two
years time for formal panflu planning efforts. As it turned out, in
contrast to prevailing views of extravagant quarantine processes,
mandatory quarantine had only a minimal role in the public health
doctors' ideas of how to effectively protect the maximum number
8. See generally HOMELAND SEC. COUNCIL, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR
PANDEMIC INFLUENZA (2005), http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/nspi.pdf.
9. See generally CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, INTERIM PRE-PANDEMIC
PLANNING GUIDANCE: COMMUNITY STRATEGY FOR PANDEMIC INFLUENZA
MITIGATION IN THE UNITED STATES-EARLY, TARGETED, LAYERED USE OF
NONPHARMACEUTICAL INTERVENTIONS (2007), http://www.pandemicflu.gov/
plan/community/communitymitigation.pdf.
10. FLA. STAT. § 381.0011(6) (2007).
11. CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, CDC INFLUENZA PANDEMIC OPLAN,
Annex F (2008), http://www.cdc.gov/flu/pandemic/OPLAN/Annex-F.pdf.
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of people who might be exposed to the pathogen.12 Although the
planning group published its first plan on the Internet, the
Department still fielded many wild comments from observers;
people demanded to know why the Department was going to shut
down the Tri-Rail System in the West Palm Beach-to-Miami
corridor (it was not; it said so in the Introduction to the plan-no
closure of transport systems or highways) and why the Department
was going to quarantine entire communities (it was not; same
paragraph--no mass quarantines).13
The Department's legal office viewed quarantine authority as
an exercise of police power, even admitting that there are
administrative characteristics to the process of ordering quarantine,
such as government forms. Florida's Administrative Procedures
Act ("APA") 14 describes forms as a species of "rule,"'15 requiring
that they undergo review by the legislature's Joint Administrative
Procedures Committee, which has a forms committee. 6 The
Department did not do that. The Department maintains that
proposed model quarantine forms are an administrative
convenience for the internal use of the Department and county
health departments, not a vehicle for regulating the public--at least
not yet. If panflu manifests, the Department can adopt forms via
emergency rule.
17
The Florida Bar's Health Law Section published a lengthy
chapter in its Health Law Handbook about the Department's
general health authority including mandatory quarantine
authority.18 That publication drew no comment, though there was
vigorous discussion when the paper was presented at a meeting of
the section. This author posted a White Paper on the Florida Law
of Human Quarantine along with a companion FAQ for Florida
12. See FLA. DEP'T OF HEALTH, STATE OF FLORIDA EMERGENCY
OPERATIONS PLAN, Pandemic Influenza Annex, app. 7 (2006), http://www.doh.
state.fl.us/rwBulletins/flpanfluvl04final.pdf (discussing quarantine in the
context of medical response).
13. Id. at 1.
14. FLA. STAT. § 120.50-.81 (2007).
15. § 120.52(15).
16. § 120.545.
17. § 120.54(4).
18. Rodney Johnson & Richard McNelis, Public Health-Legal Basics, in
THE FLORIDA BAR, FLORIDA PRACTITIONER'S HEALTH LAW HANDBOOK ch. 14
(2007).
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judges, lawyers, and law enforcement on several Internet sites.' 9
There was little response to those documents although there was a
steady stream of questions indicating that during a quarantine
event the health department should provide for all the needs of the
citizenry. There were blanket assumptions that health departments
should compensate citizens for lost wages (unemployment
benefits), food, medication, legal representation to challenge the
health order, transportation, and alternate residence sites for family
members when another member is quarantined. There was at least
tacit acknowledgement that the Department's staff attorneys and
county health department attorneys are ethically prohibited from
simultaneously representing both the Department and a
quarantined citizen, although the participation of private counsel
would be welcomed by the government's counsel and probably by
any judicial officer hearing the challenge.
But when panflu became the danger of the moment, discussion
quickly moved to the very authority of the Department to issue ex
parte health orders. Closely related to that, there arose the issue of
challenges to quarantine orders. But what would be the point of
suspending quarantine orders on due process grounds? Is there a
workable hearing system we could apply to a planeload of
passengers, unfortunate enough to have shared a trip with a person
seriously ill with a dangerous communicable disease, now waiting
in an airport terminal concourse? Would review after the order
issues be through an administrative action under APA procedures
or a petition for writ of habeas corpus under the Florida
Constitution? 21 Ultimately, debate was framed by the Supreme
Court of Florida during the compilation of its Pandemic Influenza
Benchguide (the Bench Book).22 It is a common experience in the
practice of law to read court assessments of important matters, but
19. The White Paper is now incorporated as appendix B of the Florida
Pandemic Influenza Benchguide. FLA. COURT EDUC. COUNCIL, PANDEMIC
INFLUENZA BENCHGUIDE: LEGAL ISSUES CONCERNING QUARANTINE AND
ISOLATION, app. B (2007), http://www.flcourts.org/gen_public/courted/bin/
pandemic benchguide.pdf [hereinafter BENCHGUIDE]. See also Florida Quarantine
and Isolation FAQ, http://www2a.cdc.gov/phlp/docs/FAQ%20Quarantine%
20FL%20judges%20Oct%2006.pdf (last visited May 12, 2008).
20. See FLA. STAT. BARR. 4-1.7(a)(1) (2007).
21. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 13; FLA. STAT. § 120.57 (2007).
22. BENCHGUIDE, supra note 19.
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there were some genuine surprises for the Department of Health in
the Bench Book.
III. EXPRESS POWERS OF THE HEALTH DEPARTMENT
Florida's statutory quarantine scheme is a classic, old-
fashioned, sweeping public health grant of broad power to respond
to unspecified communicable diseases. Enacted in 1991 and
amended slightly nearly every year since, it gives the Department
authority to tell people to go or not go to certain locations, or to
destroy domestic animals. The Department can order medical
testing and medical treatment, including vaccination, as part of
quarantine.25 Isolation orders are a subset of quarantine orders.26
Only the Department of Health can restrict travel or trade within
the state for public health reasons; no other government agency can
do so. 2
7
Consistent with the Florida legislature's probable
understanding that Florida legislature that quarantine is a police
power exercise, it did not require the official issuing the order to
identify himself. There is no express legal requirement, for
example, that the order bear a signature at all, such as required for
a court order. The County Health Department Director (a medical
doctor) or Administrator (a layperson) may issue quarantine orders
directly, or through their delegates. 28 The rule actually reads "give
public notice of quarantine," obliquely acknowledging that this is
an exercise of state police power.29 For that reason, the name of
the official giving such notice is irrelevant because the state has
ordered the quarantine. The health department has no law
enforcement jurisdiction, but can enforce its orders simply by
requesting assistance from other agencies of government. The
statutory enforcement vehicle provides, "It shall be the duty of
every state and county attorney, sheriff, police officer, and other
appropriate city and county officials upon request to assist the
23. FLA. STAT. § 381.0011(6) (2007).
24. § 381.0011(6)(a)(2), (6).
25. Id.; FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. R. 64D-3.007(2) (2007).
26. R. 64D-3.007(2).
27. § 381.0011(6)(b).
28. R. 64D-3.005(1).
29. Id.
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department or any of its agents in enforcing the state health laws
and the rules., 30  And "[a]ny person who violates any of the
provisions of this chapter, any quarantine, or any rule adopted by
the department under the provisions of this chapter is guilty of a
misdemeanor of the second degree." 31 Violation of a quarantine
order is a second degree misdemeanor with a maximum penalty of
sixty days incarceration.
32
People today are accustomed to orders that have a fixed
lifespan and are less comfortable with orders that remain in force
until a problem is resolved or cured. Quarantine in theory could
last a long time, as in situations where disease lingers in a
community. "The quarantine shall remain in effect until the
situation no longer represents a public health hazard as determined
by the county health department director or administrator or their
designated representative." 33 Even where a health rule seems to
require a termination date, it is only an option: "Quarantine orders
shall be issued by the State Health Officer, or the county health
department director or administrator, or their designee in writing;
include an expiration date or specify condition(s) for ending of
quarantine."
34
IV. DIvINING THE INTENT OF THE LEGISLATURE
This is the kind of power that makes people uneasy if they
think about it, but it did not slow our grandfathers, who grew up in
the age before antibiotics, before people thought the war against
infectious disease was won. Those people, in 1955, enacted a
health statute still in effect that states, "The authority, action, and
proceedings of the department in enforcing the rules adopted by it
under the provisions of this chapter shall be regarded as judicial in
nature and treated as prima facie just and legal.",35 This language
was puzzling to the Department until research brought to light a
30. § 381.0012(5).
31. § 381.0025(1).
32. §§ 381.0025(1),775.082(4)(b).
33. R. 64D-3.037(3)-(4). See, e.g., R. 64D-3.038(3).
34. R. 64D-3.038(1) (emphasis added).
35. § 381.0015.
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1918 opinion of the Supreme Court of Washington. 36 The statute
before the Washington court said,
In case of the question arising as to whether or not any
person is affected or is sick with a dangerous, contagious or
infectious disease.., the opinion of the executive officer of
the state board of health, or any member or physician he
may appoint to examine such case, shall be final.37
The ultimate question presented to the Washington Supreme Court
was whether the legislature had the power to create a board of
health and make its rulings final and conclusive, such as when
called into question in a court of general jurisdiction. The court
stated, "The power to detain one who is suspected of having a
contagious disease rests in the police power, [which is] 'to the
public what the law of necessity is to the individual. ,, 38
Dealing primarily with challenges to the factual basis for health
detention in a habeas corpus proceeding, the court declined to
review the fact determinations of the board of health medical
officers, saying that to do so "would make the exercise of the
police power a judicial function."39 The court asked if the record
in the case was framed as a test for credit, with questions, answers,
and credit for each question,
who would determine whether or not a particular answer
had received a sufficient credit? Certainly not the jury, for
they are not presumably competent to pass a proper
judgment on such subjects. Not the judge, for his
qualifications do not embrace, or at least require, an expert
knowledge . . . . Expert witnesses could not be properly
permitted to testify for the reason that the state has already
designated and empowered experts to pass upon these
questions presumably by reason of their recognized
qualifications.4 °
36. State ex rel. McBride v. Superior Court for King County, 174 P. 973
(Wash. 1918).
37. Id. at 975 (quoting WASH. REM. CODE § 5546).
38. Id. at 976 (quoting State v. Mountain Timber Co., 135 P. 645, 648
(Wash. 1913)).
39. Id. at 978.
40. Id. at 979.
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The court ultimately held that the legislature had the power in
public health matters to make a medically-determined fact final
and binding on the public and the courts.41 The court wrote that a
statute providing "that the finding of the health officers shall be
final is a sufficient evidence of legislative intent to leave the whole
matter to the health officers without restraint on the part of the
courts. 4 2
In light of the Washington explanation, it seems the 1955
Florida legislature intended that medical judgments should be
made by the doctors of the health department, and not by courts.
The statute, then, is consistent with the health department's current
approach, viewing the decision to quarantine as a medical decision.
And it further appears that the Florida legislature intended such a
medical decision to possess at least prima facie validity. The
statute stops short of saying that the medical decision is actually
judicial.
There is a companion statute dating from the same Florida
legislative session, from the same bill, apparently with a similar
rationale, which provides, "The rules adopted by the department
under the provisions of this chapter shall, as to matters of public
health, supersede all rules enacted by other state departments,
boards or commissions, or ordinances and regulations enacted by
municipalities," with some exceptions. 43 This statutory language
seems to be an affirmation of the trust the legislature has in the
medical practitioners it employs, and that all agencies of
government should defer to that expertise. Both of these statutes
pre-date Florida's general quarantine authority statute by many
years.
V. EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
Consequently, it may be unsurprising that there is no role in the
statutory scheme for the courts in the designation, preparation, text,
service, or enforcement of health department quarantine orders.
This is consistent with the legislature's structure of emergency
41. Id.
42. Id. at 978 (citing with approval State ex rel. City of Aberdeen v.
Superior Court of Chehalis County, 87 P. 818 (1906)).
43. FLA. STAT. § 381.0014 (2007).
2008] 1153
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management generally. 44  As to mandatory quarantines, the
function of the Florida courts is review following governmental
action; there is no participatory role. Florida's governor has
authority to issue executive orders with a renewable sixty-day
lifespan, proclamations, and rules, and to amend or rescind them. 5
The governor's orders have "the force and effect of law.' 46 Those
orders typically correspond to requirements of the federal Stafford
Act.47 The governor can suspend any statute or state program that
impedes response to an emergency. 48 The Florida governor in
respect to his chapter 252 powers is subject to Florida's
Administrative Procedures Act 49 (the Florida legislature has
exempted only itself and the Florida courts from that Act),50 but no
one suggests that during an emergency the governor's orders
should be reviewed by the administrative courts.
VI. NATURE OF ORDERS
Pivotal to the entire business of orders is the individualized
nature of the order and service on a person. The governor's
executive and supplemental orders of emergency are issued to the
entire state of Florida, not to any individual person. Quarantine
orders, by contrast, are purposely crafted to inform an identified
person exactly how to follow health department directions. But the
governor's orders are immediately enforceable by law enforcement
officers. Indeed, the emergency management statute says, "The
law enforcement authorities of the state and the political
subdivisions thereof shall enforce" those emergency orders and
rules issued under chapter 252. 51 Violation of such orders and
rules is, once again, a second degree misdemeanor. 52 Standard
provisions of emergency orders allow the governor to control
ingress and egress of an emergency area and the movement of
44. See generally §§ 252.31-946.
45. § 252.36(1)(b).
46. Id.
47. Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act
(Stafford Act), Pub. L. No. 100-707 (1988).
48. § 252.36(5)(a).
49. § 120.52(l)(a).
50. § 120.50.
51. § 252.47.
52. § 252.50.
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persons and occupancy of premises therein. The governor may
also control the conduct of civilians and the movement of
pedestrian and vehicular traffic. 53 These controls are restrictions of
citizens' liberty, yet the governor is under no duty in promulgation
of his emergency orders to advise citizens of their legal rights to
challenge these measures, nor to assure them he has taken steps to
ensure their due process rights and access to justice. On the
contrary, the emergency management statute states that those
measures shall be liberally construed so as to effect their
purposes.54  In actual practice, Florida's governor delegates
sweeping authority to the Director of the Division of Emergency
Management and other persons "as he may deem prudent."
55
VII. CURFEW AND RABIES CONTROL
Although it is a common thing for people to express questions,
reservations, and objections about quarantine, evidently all people
intrinsically understand curfew. Interestingly, there is scarcely a
mention of curfew in the Florida statutes, yet the parallels with
quarantine are obvious. Both are obvious liberty restrictions, often
requiring persons to remain at home or at least off the public
streets; both often involve area closures and prohibit public
assembly; both are associated with emergency situations, and
invoked locally. The specific legal elements are "substantial
defiance of, or resistance to, a lawful exercise of public authority"
and reasonable belief in a danger of general public disorder.56 On
those elements, a sheriff or local official may declare a state of
emergency within the jurisdiction. If the situation qualifies as a
"riotous assembly," officials "shall in the name of the state
command all the persons so assembled immediately and peaceably
to disperse." 57 Whenever such a declaration issues, the official
may establish curfew.5 8 Florida citizens commonly encounter
curfew in storm and hurricane ravaged areas, and other emergency
53. § 252.36(5)(g), (k).
54. § 252.52.
55. § 252.36(1)(a).
56. § 870.043.
57. § 870.04.
58. § 870.045(1).
2008] 1155
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settings. Violation of curfew is a first degree misdemeanor,
punishable by maximum of one year incarceration.
5 9
As in the case of the governor's emergency orders, the local
emergency orders are public notice orders not served on individual
persons, yet fully and immediately enforceable. There are no
reported cases of judicial review of emergency curfew orders, nor
any judicial opinions requiring officials to advise the public of due
process rights or the procedures to challenge the curfew.
People also seem to accept governmental action in the form of
rabies control, whether that action is aimed at pets, domestic
animals, or wild animals. Being informed of a bite or exposure to
a rabid animal, a Florida CHD Director or Administrator is
required to capture, confine, or seize suspected rabid animals and
isolate and quarantine or humanely euthanize them. 60 When
information indicates epizootic 61 rabies, the health officer is
required to declare an area-wide quarantine 62 to protect public
health and bring an end to the outbreak. The health department
procedures for controlling rabies outbreaks are set out in a
guidebook, adopted by rule,63 entitled Rabies Prevention and
Control in Florida.64 Most Florida counties have adopted animal
control ordinances 65 and work closely with the health department
in rabies actions, which often include hearings before
administrative boards composed of county animal control
employees to determine whether animals should be euthanized,
observed (quarantined) in a veterinary clinical setting, or handled
otherwise. Those procedures have never been brought within the
domain of Florida's APA, although they determine property rights
of the citizens. Animals, of course, are chattels and themselves
59. §§ 870.048; 775.082.
60. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. R. 64D-3.013(2)(c) (2007).
61. "Affecting a large number of animals at the same time within a
particular region or geographic area. Used of a disease." THE AMERICAN
HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed. 2005),
http://www.ask.com/reference/dictionary/ahdict/46068/epizootic.
62. R. 64D-3.013(2)(d).
63. R. 64D-3.013(2)(c).
64. FLA. DEP'T OF HEALTH, Div. OF ENVTL HEALTH, RABIES PREVENTION
AND CONTROL IN FLORIDA (2007), http://www.doh.state.fl.us/environment/
conimunity/arboviral/Zoonoses/Rabiesguide2OO7.pdf.
65. See, e.g., Leon County Animal Control Division, Animal Control
Chapter 4 Ordinance, Ordinance -No. 05-02 (2005), http://www.leoncountyfl.
gov/Animal/pdfs/AnimalControlOrdinance2.pdf.
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possess no due process rights under our legal system. Their
owners do, and areas closed under a rabies quarantine order of the
health department are closed to humans and animals alike.
VIII. LIBERTY RESTRICTION BY QUARANTINE
The least controversial thing in all the discussions about
mandatory quarantine was the idea that it is another liberty
restriction, inviting constitutional issues of freedom of movement,
right of free association, possibly impinging freedom of religion,
almost surely restricting freedom of assembly, and so forth. The
health department had powerful support for the notion of habeas
corpus review in a decision of the Supreme Court of Florida,
Varholy v. Sweat.66 In 1943 in the Jacksonville, Florida area,
Pauline Varholy was confined to the county jail under a health
department order, awaiting transfer to a health department
67hospital. She petitioned the trial court of Duval County for a writ
of habeas corpus, and, together with the sheriff, health officials
appeared in court and testified to facts indicating Ms. Varholy had
venereal disease and that the health department had a curative
plan.68  The trial court denied the petition for writ, and Ms.
Varholy appealed directly to the Supreme Court of Florida,
protesting detention and excessive bail. 69  The Supreme Court
wrote:
Generally speaking, rules and regulations necessary to
protect the public health are legislative questions, and
appropriate methods intended and calculated to accomplish
these ends will not be disturbed by the courts. All
reasonable presumptions should be indulged in favor of the
validity of the action of the legislature and the duly
constituted health authorities. But the constitutional
guarantees of personal liberty and private property cannot
be unreasonably and arbitrarily invaded. The courts have
the right to inquire into any alleged unconstitutional
exercise or abuse of the police powers of the legislature, or
66. 15 So. 2d 267 (Fla. 1943).
67. Id. at 268.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 269.
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of the health authorities in the enactment of statutes or
regulations, or the abuse or misuse by the Boards of Health
or their officers and agents of such authority as may be
lawfully vested in them by such statutes or regulations.
However, the preservation of the public health is one of
the prime duties resting upon the sovereign power of the
State. The health of the people has long been recognized as
one of the greatest social and economic blessings. The
enactment and enforcement of necessary and appropriate
health laws and regulations is a legitimate exercise of the
police power which is inherent in the State and which it
cannot surrender. The Federal government also possesses
similar powers with respect to subjects within its
jurisdiction. The constitutional guarantees of life, liberty
and property, of which a person cannot be deprived without
due process of law, do not limit the exercise of the police
power of the State to preserve the public health so long as
that power is reasonably and fairly exercised and not
abused. The legislative authority in this legitimate field of
the police power, like as in other fields, is fenced about by
constitutional limitations, and it cannot properly be
exercised beyond such reasonable interferences as are
really of action of individuals as are really necessary to
preserve and protect the public health. It has been said that
the test, when such regulations are called in question, is
whether they have some actual and reasonable relation to
the maintenance and promotion of the public health and
welfare, and whether such is in fact the end sought to be
attained. Not only must every reasonable presumption be
indulged in favor of the validity of legislative action in this
important field, but also in favor of the validity of the
regulations and actions of the health authorities.70
The Varholy opinion teaches several important lessons, all
germane today: quarantine already has passed constitutional
muster with the Supreme Court of Florida; the quarantine power is
a legitimate exercise of the police power of the state; habeas
corpus is the proper remedy to challenge it; the trial court is the
70. Id. at 269-70.
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right place to bring the challenge; constitutional rights to liberty
are not absolute and may have to bend to the police power in
public health matters; the proper constitutional test is a rational
relationship; the courts generally will not entertain challenges to
the discretion of public health officers; and, as the court later
stated, because quarantine is not a criminal matter, bail is not
available.7'
Subsequent to the Varholy opinion, the Florida Supreme Court
approved a Florida statute that allowed compulsory confinement of
people with tuberculosis, and opined,
The health of the people is unquestionably an economic
asset and social blessing, and the science of public health is
therefore of great importance.... That the preservation of
the public health is one of the duties devolving upon the
state as a sovereign power will not be questioned. Among
all the objects sought to be secured by governmental laws
none is more important than the preservation of public
health. . . .The constitutional guaranties that no person
shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law, and that no state shall deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, were
not intended to limit the subjects upon which the police
power of a state may lawfully be asserted in this any more
than in any other connection.
IX. LEGISLATIVE OVERRIDE
In 1943, the Florida Supreme Court declared in Varholy that
"the courts have the right to inquire into any alleged
unconstitutional exercise or abuse of the police powers of the
legislature or of the health authorities," 73 and in 1952 said the
constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection were
not intended to limit the subjects of state police power actions.74
Shortly thereafter, the 1955 Florida legislature adopted a statute
providing that the authority, action, and proceedings of the health
71. Id. at 270.
72. Moore v. Draper, 57 So. 2d 648, 649 (Fla. 1952).
73. 15 So. 2d at 269.
74. Moore, 57 So. 2d at 649.
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department "shall be regarded as judicial in nature and treated as
prima facie just and legal., 75 That statute may have been (and may
be) a legislative override of the court's power to review health
department actions.
In the setting of administrative law, the Florida courts
respected a 1999 legislative override regarding the scope of
executive branch agency rulemaking authority. Until 1998, the
legislative restriction on administrative agency rulemaking powers
was codified at section 120.52(8) of the Florida Statutes, which
stated:
An agency may adopt only rules that implement, interpret,
or make specific the particular powers and duties granted
by the enabling statute. No agency shall have authority to
adopt a rule only because it is reasonably related to the
purpose of the enabling legislation and is not arbitrary and
capricious, nor shall an agency have the authority to
implement statutory provisions setting forth general
legislative intent or policy. Statutory language granting
rulemaking authority or generally describing the powers
and functions of an agency shall be construed to extend no
further than the particular powers and duties conferred by
the same statute.
76
The appellate court in St. Johns River Water Management
District v. Consolidated Tomoka Land Co. ruled that the "class of
powers and duties" of agencies formed the legal basis to support
rule criteria adopted by the St. Johns River Water Management
District.77 The Consolidated Tomoka decision was flatly rejected
by the legislature in its next session, which amended section
120.52(8) to bar the "class of powers and duties" standard set out
by the court. The amended language stated:
An agency may adopt only rules that implement or interpret
the specific powers and duties granted by the enabling
statute. No agency shall have authority to adopt a rule only
because it is reasonably related to the purpose of the
75. FLA. STAT. § 381.0015 (2007).
76. FLA. STAT. § 120.52(8) (1998 Supp.) (emphasis added).
77. 717 So. 2d 72 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
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enabling legislation and is not arbitrary and capricious or is
within the agency's class of powers and duties, nor shall an
agency have the authority to implement statutory
provisions setting forth general legislative intent or policy.
Statutory language granting rulemaking authority or
generally describing the powers and functions of an agency
shall be construed to extend no further than implementing
or interpreting the specific powers and duties conferred by
the same statute.
Shortly thereafter, the same court in Southwest Florida Water
Management District v. Save the Manatee Club, Inc. accepted the
legislature's statutory mandate and read section 120.52(8)
narrowly, stating that rulemaking is a function "within the
exclusive authority of the legislature., 79  Nor have subsequent
courts disturbed this override by the Florida legislature.
The 1999 Florida legislature offered no explanation for its
change of wording in the amending legislation, and the members
publicly denied any attempt to overrule a court, but their actions
appear not to support those denials. In light of the foregoing, we
may conclude-at least in Florida-that legislative override of the
judiciary is a reality we must include in our assessment of the
meaning of statutes, even when no legislative intent is expressed in
the enacting legislation.
X. DEFERENCE To AGENCY EXPERTISE
In any event, the scope of judicial review of agency decisions
remains a difficult and pivotal policy choice. Professor Edward
Richards has observed, "If the courts review all agency decisions
de novo, rehearing expert witnesses and substituting their decisions
for those of the agencies, the government loses the value of agency
expertise and flexibility." 80  The business of setting the proper
standard for judicial review is controversial because judicial
deference to agency decisions "prevents opponents of public
78. FLA. STAT. § 120.52(8) (1999) (emphasis added).
79. 773 So. 2d 594, 598(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
80. Edward P. Richards, Public Health Law as Administrative Law:
Example Lessons, 10 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 61, 68 (2007).
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actions from being able to contest these actions." 81 So what is the
correct form of judicial review? Most commentators agree that the
seminal public health case is Jacobson v. Massachusetts, a
mandatory smallpox vaccination case from 1904.82 With language
that some describe as "sweeping," the U.S. Supreme Court
pronounced that the price of civilized society was the surrender of
some individual autonomy, that Jacobson was not entitled to rely
on the protection provided by vaccination of his neighbors (no free
ride on "herd immunity"), and that Jacobson could not challenge
the legislative policy decision with evidence of risks inherent in the
vaccine-no collateral attack on the legislative decision. In a later
decision, the U.S. Supreme Court restated its deference standard,
stating, "The judicial function is exhausted with the discovery that
the relation between means and end is not wholly vain and fanciful,
an illusory pretence. Within the field where men of reason may
reasonably differ, the legislature must have its way."
84
XI. IMPLICIT EXTINCTION OF POLICE POWER?
While developing its Bench Book, the Florida Supreme Court's
legal advisor took the position that enactment of Florida's
Administrative Procedures Act subjected all existing executive
branch powers to administrative status, reviewable by the central
panel of professional administrative law judges of the Division of
Administrative Hearings (DOAH) In other words, the APA
extinguished the police power. Presumably, this position was
based on Florida Statutes section 120.50 (exempting the legislature
and courts from the APA). No other legal authority was cited in
support of the court's position. The court stated,
If an agency order were entered with no right to a hearing,
either before or after the rendition of the order, it would be
subject to summary reversal on appeal. The appellate court
would not even have to reach the constitutional issue.
81. Id. at 69.
82. 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
83. Id.
84. Williams v. Mayor of Baltimore, 289 U.S. 36 (1933).
85. See State of Florida, Division of Administrative Hearings, http://www.
doah.state.fl.us/intemet/ (last visited May 7, 2008).
[Vol. 681162
PROBLEMA TIC APPLICATION
Pursuant to section 120.68(7), Florida Statutes, "the court
shall remand a case to the agency for further proceedings...
or set aside agency action.., when it finds that:
(a) There has been no hearing prior to agency action and
the reviewing court finds that the validity of the action
depends upon disputed facts; or
(b) The agency's action depends on any finding of fact
that is not supported by competent, substantial evidence in
the record of a hearing conducted pursuant to ss. 120.569
and 120.57. "86
Where a state agency engaged in licensing finds an immediate
serious danger to the public health, safety, or welfare, it may order
the emergency suspension, restriction, or limitation of a license,
but only if the agency files a companion administrative complaint
that will give the respondent licensee an opportunity for a
hearing.8 7 But that post-deprivation hearing provision exists under
the APA only in a licensing setting. The court quoted,
If an agency head finds that an immediate danger to the
public health, safety, or welfare requires an immediate final
order, it shall recite with particularity the facts underlying
such finding in the final order, which shall be appealable or
enjoinable from the date rendered.8 8
The court also observed,
Taken at face value, this provision makes no provision for
any administrative hearing before or after an "immediate
final order" and it would thus make any such order
vulnerable to reversal on appeal, as mentioned above.
Needless to say, it could have a strongly adverse effect on
the executive branch's efforts to control a pandemic if the
appellate courts summarily vacated the executive branch's
quarantine orders. The remedies suggested in this
subdivision are not perfect procedural vehicles, and they
have not been extensively tested on appeal, but they could
86. BENCHGUIDE, supra note 19, at 40 (emphasis omitted).
87. FLA. STAT. § 120.60(6) (2007).
88. BENCHGUIDE, supra note 19, at 40 (quoting § 120.569(2)(n)).
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serve to provide sufficient procedural due _process to allow
the system to function during a pandemic.
8
Even if the Florida legislature intended to abandon its police
power authority over public health matters, that abandonment
would have to be express in law. Yet there is no supporting
statement of legislative intention anywhere in Florida's
Administrative Procedures Act, revisited many times since its
enactment in 1974. It is preposterous to assume that the power
defined by Justice Taney could be implicitly extinguished, if that
were even possible, as an unintended consequence of the
enactment of the APA. Exercise of sovereign authority cannot be
so casually cast aside.
XII. DIFFICULT PROBLEMS SURROUNDING
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT REVIEW
Review of quarantine orders through administrative law
proceedings fails for several reasons. First, quarantined petitioners
do not have standing to litigate in administrative courts because
they cannot meet the "substantial interests" prong of the standing
test.9° They cannot show an injury resulting from the violation of a
right that the proceeding is designed to protect. Second, quarantine
controls behavior in order to slow or stop the spread of disease, is
designed to protect the health of the general public rather than
protect the individual, and is not an action similar to the health
department's regulatory jurisdiction over licensing and discipline
of license holders. Quarantine declarations, predicated on objective
scientific criteria, are not agency actions designed to protect an
individual's liberty or property interests, but instead are crafted to
protect the public health. Moreover, because quarantine time
periods appear to last only days, there likely will be insufficient
time for hearing disputed material facts before the quarantine
expires or is modified. Third, neither health department personnel
sitting as hearing officers, nor the Department administrative law
89. Id. at 40-41.
90. See Agrico Chemical Co. v. Dep't of Envtl. Regulation, 406 So. 2d 478
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
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judges, possess jurisdiction to rule on constitutional issues9' or to
entertain extraordinary writs. Therefore they have no authority to
grant liberty to a detained person regardless of the facts. 92 Fourth,
the health department has exclusive statutory authority among
executive branch agencies to modify or lift its quarantine orders.
93
Even if the Department ultimately was forced to defend its
quarantine orders in the administrative courts, the timelines for
those proceedings would work against speedy resolution. Upon
receipt of a request for hearing, the Department is statutorily
entitled to consider for fifteen days before referring the case to the
Department panel of administrative law judges.9  Likewise the
Administrative Procedures Act itself requires a minimum of
fourteen days following a notice of hearing before the hearing may
take place.95 Assuming an adverse outcome, the Department may
take fifteen days from receipt of the Proposed Recommended
Order to file its exceptions (objections).96 Once those objections
are ruled on, the agency head may take up to ninety days from the
date of hearing to issue a Final Order. 97 Those time periods, to
which the health department is entitled, total 119 days to litigate an
objection to quarantine. Assuming a bad public health result and
zero motion practice, the Department will probably have an
additional 180 days to act on the appellate case. And the latest
CDC guidance does not support involuntary personal quarantine,
so perhaps the whole thing will prove moot.
91. See Gulf Pines Memorial Park, Inc. v. Oaklawn Memorial Park, Inc.,
361 So. 2d 695, 699 (Fla. 1978) (citing Dep't of Revenue v. Young Am.
Builders, 330 So. 2d 864 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1976)). See also Shinholster v.
Graham, 527 F. Supp. 1318, 1322 (N.D. Fla. 1981).
92. But see Florida Baker Act, FLA. STAT. § 394.451-.4789 (2007)
(regarding mental health commitments). Under the Baker Act, the patient
litigates through habeas while the institution litigates through an administrative
path. The patient may question the cause and legality of detention ("placement")
via habeas corpus at any time. § 394.459(8)(a). After initial placement, the
institution may petition in administrative court for continued commitment on a
factual basis. § 394.467(7)(b). The DOAH administrative law judge may
recognize those facts and order continued commitment for up to six months. §
394.467(7)(d).
93. § 381.001 1(6)(a).
94. § 120.569(2)(a).
95. § 120.569(2)(b).
96. § 120.57(1)(k).
97. § 120.569(2)(1).
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XIII. SOCIAL DISTANCING ORDERS
No discussion of quarantine orders is complete without
mention of that other variety of non-pharmaceutical intervention:
the social distancing order. Because social distancing-keeping
your distance-exhorts the general public to avoid close contact
with no punishment expressed for violation, and because the orders
are not compulsory, but adviso-y only, the current health
department thinking assumes the orders are not enforceable at all,
unless perhaps asserted by the governor or local officials in
response to emergency declarations. The health department views
social distancing orders as exercises of authority under its public
health advisory power.
98
XIV. SUMMARY
It has become something of a legal fad in Florida to insist upon
identification of specific statutory authority in order to support
executive agency action. This notion probably is traceable to the
Florida experience with scope of agency authority and legislative
override, as described above. The influential language is in the
Florida APA definition of "invalid exercise of delegated legislative
authority"99 and cautions agencies that their rulemaking authority
is limited to "the specific powers and duties granted by the
enabling statute."'100 A U.S. Supreme Court opinion is often cited
in support of the same limitation.10' But the insistence on specific
statutory authority, while prudent and consoling, does not represent
the scope of power possessed by state governments-it leaves out
the police power. The FDA could not expand its jurisdictional
reach over the tobacco industry precisely because, as a federal
government agency, it was a government of limited powers and
98. § 381.00315(1)(a).
99. § 120.52(8).
100. § 120.52(8)(f).
101. Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S.
120, 123 (2000) ("No matter how important, conspicuous, and controversial the
issue, and regardless of how likely the public is to hold the Executive Branch
politically accountable, an administrative agency's power to regulate in the
public interest must always be grounded in a valid grant of authority from
Congress. Courts must take care not to extend a statute's scope beyond the
point where Congress indicated it would stop." (citation omitted)).
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could not go further than Congress and the federal courts would
allow. 102 Even so, the state governments have sweeping power,
only occasionally written down at all, to protect public health and
safety. It is the same power that allows a fire chief to order people
to leave their homes because a chlorine gas cloud is coming their
way. That power cannot be found in the Florida Statutes, yet it
exists. We all know it.
Enforceable public health orders stand in the police power of
government, power that is synonymous with sovereignty itself.
The U.S. Supreme Court long ago defined quarantine as an express
example of state police power, equal in standing with the adoption
of criminal codes, creation of court systems, creation of systems of
public records for transactions in lands, and commercial
regulation-in essence, the very "power to govern men." 10 3 It is
not a mere administrative process. The fact that a legislature
creates a judiciary of limited jurisdiction to review regulatory
decisions does not vitiate the police power assigned to health
departments. Police power has not breathed its last under such
petty slights, because every agency of government with emergency
responsibilities has an independent duty to compel behavior in the
public interest. That is the essence of good government, which
will always be worth having-to serve the public interest.
102. Id.
103. The License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 583 (1847) (Taney, C.J.,
majority opinion).
11672008]

